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HONOR AND CIVIL RECOURSE: A RESPONSE TO
NATHAN OMAN’S THE HONOR OF PRIVATE LAW
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
INTRODUCTION
Nathan Oman’s brilliant and provocative article The Honor of Private
Law1 asserts that private law must be understood as a system for the
vindication of lost honor. While he enthusiastically embraces civil recourse
theory and graciously credits me and my frequent collaborator John
Goldberg for pointing private law theorists down the right path, Oman
faults us for failing to supply an adequate defense of civil recourse theory.
Seeking to remedy this deficit, Oman advances an honor-based justification
for civil recourse theory.
Readers should find great pleasure in reading Oman’s article, not only
because of its freshness, originality, and powerful ideas, but also because it
is beautifully written and provides an illuminating account of several
important aspects of English legal history. The article presses on
vulnerabilities in my own work in a way that I would have, if I had been
able to see them clearly, and it offers alternative ways of thinking about
problems that present great promise for continuing the general project of
civil recourse theory. Moreover, Oman quite appropriately selects private
law—not just tort law—as the subject matter that civil recourse theory
should be aspiring to explain.
This Essay is divided into two parts, the first critical and the second
constructive. Part I is a broad-gauged critique of Oman’s honor theory of
private law, particularly as applied to torts: it argues that the “Honor”
thesis, as Oman has put it, is unsustainable at the level of positive law, at
the level of participants’ self-understanding of private law, and at a
normative level. Part II switches gears. It proposes an honor justification
of private law that is rights-based, not teleological, and argues that such an
account is far more plausible. The Essay concludes by arguing that the
positive, hermeneutical, and normative concerns raised by the teleological
account are not problematic once a rights-foundation is provided for
Oman’s honor-engaging justification of private law.

* Associate Dean for Research & James H. Quinn Professor, Fordham Law School.
1. 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 (2011).
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I. A CRITIQUE OF OMAN’S HONOR THESIS
A. Injury and Diminution of Honor
“Civil recourse allows for the regaining of honor in the face of its loss by
giving the victim a means of acting against a wrongdoer.”2 In this passage,
Oman seems to be suggesting that just as a plaintiff in restitution may
regain the chattels possessed by another, so a tort plaintiff may, by suing the
tortfeasor, regain the honor that she lost as a victim of the tort. The
bringing of the tort action—if it a successful tort claim—vindicates the
plaintiff as in the right and defendant in the wrong, and thereby restores the
plaintiff’s honor.
Part of what is effective about this analysis is the idea that there is some
special attribute—honor (or dignity)—that was threatened or damaged by
the tort and that is restored by the tort action and judgment. When Oman
describes the attribute and how it is restored, it is clear that honor for him is
in part a kind of esteem; it relates to how one is regarded by others in one’s
community. That is in part why the plaintiff’s agency in obtaining a
judgment against the defendant is critical. The plaintiff is seen to be
successfully redressing what the defendant did to her. The loss of esteem
inherent in having been wrongfully victimized by another is regained.
Just as Oman’s analysis fits dueling quite well, it fits some torts quite
well too. Libel and slander are good examples. The plaintiff’s injury is a
loss of the esteem of others (and perhaps herself), a loss occasioned by
tortious treatment. The injury of diminished esteem is very much like an
injury in defamation law. It is a good of being well regarded (and
understanding oneself as well regarded) that is lost, and which tort litigation
supposedly restores.
The problem is that the injuries of tort victims are as various as the torts
themselves. Loss of honor is in effect a form of loss of esteem, and it
misses a great deal about what the wrongs of tort are to assert that each
involves essentially a loss of esteem. The many torts are comprised of
many different legal wrongs: some entailing essentially bodily injuries,
some property injuries, some financial, and so forth. Many torts are not
about a loss of honor at all.
If I were Oman, I might respond as follows: the loss of honor is not the
only or even the primary injury of each tort, but it is intrinsic to its being a
tort that it essentially involves a victim’s status—and in that sense, a loss of
honor—as against the tortfeasor. Conversely, the regaining of honor
through vindication is not the only or even the primary redress, but it is an
intrinsic part of any redress.
My problem with this anticipated response is that it stretches too far.
Classic torts such as being negligently injured by a mediocre surgeon, or
damaged by a defective product, or having a defendant near one’s residence
engage in a commercial activity that generates too much noise too much of

2. Id. at 63.
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the time are not about a loss of honor at all. They are clearly not, in the first
instance, attacks on the plaintiff’s honor or deprivations of honor. But let
us look more closely at the proposition that it is intrinsic to having been the
victim of such a tort that one’s honor is diminished.
I want to begin by rejecting (roughly, by fiat) what might be called a
“radically objectivist conception of honor,” according to which someone’s
honor could be diminished even if no one regards her honor as having been
diminished. I am therefore willing to assume that if there has been a
diminution of honor, it must be perceived by at least: (a) the plaintiff, (b)
the defendant, or (c) some third party. Each of the torts mentioned above—
medical malpractice, products liability, and nuisance—could happen in a
way that was unknown to everyone but the plaintiff. It follows that it
cannot be essential to the injury that it involves an alteration in the way that
third parties regard the plaintiff. Lost honor in the sense of lost esteem or
reputation cannot be the essence of a tort.
It is tempting to suppose that the defendant’s respect for the plaintiff
must be critical to the tort; that a plaintiff’s right of civil recourse against a
negligent surgeon is predicated on the surgeon’s not having taken her
seriously as a patient and not having shown her sufficient care. Tempting,
but untenable. Victims frequently experience medical malpractice this way,
and there are no doubt cases in which such failures of moral seriousness and
care are the nub of the problem. But there is no plausibility to the claim
that medical malpractice essentially involves such an attitude. Terrible
injuries occur when physicians are operating in complete good faith, and
they simply fail in their execution. The same is true of car accidents,
trespass to land, nuisance, products liability, and many areas. Liability is
not contingent on lack of respect or subjective care on the part of the
defendant.
Can we say, at least, that the injured plaintiff must have experienced a
loss of honor, or a loss of self-esteem, or that she must herself perceive the
defendant as having acted in a manner that was lacking in respect for her or
recognition of her dignity? Again, I think not. The patient might like the
doctor and feel respect for, and respected by, the doctor. If the patient’s
post-surgical trajectory is poor and it turns out that an operation was not
well executed, the injured patient (let us suppose she developed a painful
abscess requiring further hospitalization) may well bring a medical
malpractice claim notwithstanding a perception that the physician respected
her or treated her as an equal. Just as having been injured and having been
dishonored are distinct, so conceiving of oneself as having been injured and
conceiving of oneself as having been dishonored are distinct. A loss of
control over one’s bodily functions might be a kind of injury that goes
along with loss of self-esteem, but many bodily injuries (like a painful
infection requiring hospitalization) will not.
If this analysis is correct, then a tort can occur even where there is no loss
of honor or esteem. Indeed, prototypical torts can and do occur in a way
that has little or nothing to do with the diminution of honor or esteem.
Having been the patient or victim or recipient of a tort obviously entails
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having been injured, in some sense, and an injury is essentially something
one is prima facie better off being free from. But not all tort injuries
involve the diminution of the plaintiff’s honor, or even a perception of such
a diminution.
B. Suing for Vindication of Honor
Oman might answer that the point of suing is to regain or restore honor.
Even if the tort is not an attack on honor or does not, by its own nature,
diminish honor, the very fact of having been the victim of a tort—a
“bringing down” of a kind—puts plaintiffs in a place from which they seek
vindication. Likewise, even if winning a tort suit is not itself a boost to
honor, it is a kind of vindication to win a tort suit, and this vindication is
itself a kind of social reinforcement of one’s status.
There are at least two problems with this anticipated response. First, it is
prima facie incoherent to argue that all those who are entitled to bring a
successful tort claim are entitled to regain their honor if one has conceded
that not all such persons have lost honor; one cannot regain what one has
not lost. But let us soften the suggestion a bit to deal with this problem, by
supposing that successful tort claimants are vindicated and have their honor
and status reaffirmed; having been injured, on this account, does not
necessarily diminish honor, but destabilizes the victim’s self-esteem or
honor, and creates a desire or need for vindication of honor. I am inclined
to doubt this suggestion for the same reasons that I doubted the stronger
claim about diminution of honor (and it is, after all, only my suggestion, not
Oman’s). Let us proceed, nonetheless.
Oman is careful to indicate that his honor thesis is asserted at three
levels: that private law is in fact rooted in a normative framework that aims
at the restoration of honor (positive);3 that participants in the practice
understand it in this manner (hermeneutical);4 and that its capacity to
provide the restoration of honor supplies a justification for the practice
(normative).5 After fleshing out the strengths of Oman’s view at each level,
I articulate reasons for rejecting each.
1. Positive
The most powerful argument on the positive law level is that there is a
resemblance between private law and dueling, and it is true that private law
has often been framed historically as an alternative to dueling.6 The
resemblance is that there is an artificial and stylized pairwise matching of
adversaries after one of them has decided that the other wronged her and
she should be entitled to act against the wrongdoer, and there is a socially
accepted framing of this issue. Moreover, after the event, the dispute and
complaint are resolved, one way or the other. Finally, there are indeed
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 43–49.
Id. at 63–68.
Id. at 55–63.
Id. at 48 & nn.107–11.
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courts who state that the point of the judgment is that the plaintiff will
inevitably want to hold the defendant accountable for how he has mistreated
the plaintiff, and lawful means of doing so are a superior alternative to
unlawful means.7
This account is troubling on several levels. First, as others have pointed
out, tort law is not nearly so bipolar as corrective justice theorists suggest.8
Frequently, there are multiple defendants, and the defendant is not the one
to pay. Second, we do have a good sense of what an area of private law
would look like if it were really about vindication of honor; it would look a
great deal like the common law of libel or slander, where restoration of
reputation is key, or like punitive damages or aggravated damages, where
courts award damages beyond the pecuniary because of the “highhanded”
manner in which the defendant had acted.9 Private law in general and tort
law in particular are vastly different. Third, unlike dueling, the trial or the
litigation are means of settling what actually happened, and fixing
responsibility for it; they are not symbolic. Finally, and relatedly, it is the
concrete aspect of the injury or loss that tort law appears to be restoring;
from a structural point of view, the corrective justice theorists have a
greater claim to capturing the positive law of remedies than Oman’s Honor
version of civil recourse theory.
2. Hermeneutical
In my work with John Goldberg, I have often characterized tort law as
providing plaintiffs with “an avenue of civil recourse against those who
have committed relational and injurious wrongs against them.”10 Oman
pushes this line of thinking further, asserting that plaintiffs who choose to
sue do so because they feel dishonored and disempowered, because they
believe they are entitled to demand something from the one who hurt them,
and because they seek a kind of public vindication. Private law academics
have too long ignored what the lay community sees in litigation all the time;
combativeness and litigiousness in people who feel wronged and seek
vindication, and who are perfectly candid about this.
Oman’s article brings a helpful corrective to the quite naïve and
psychologically unstudied characterization of tort law that fills today’s
hornbooks and law reviews. And yet it faces some serious problems. The
first is that he provides little empirical support for this claim. Of course, it
7. See, e.g., Grey v. Grant, (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (K.B.) (“[T]he plaintiff has
been used unlike a gentleman by the defendant in striking him, withholding his property, and
insisting upon his privilege, all of this tending to provoke him to seek his revenge in another
way than by law, and therefore we think the damages are not excessive.”).
8. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1620–
21 (2004) (citing asbestos litigation as an example of failure of the bipolarity model).
9. Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1972] A.C. 1027, 1085 (H.L.) (recognizing that a higher
level of damages are warranted where the defendant “behaved in a highhanded, malicious,
insulting or oppressive manner in committing the tort”).
10. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
946 (2010).
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is quite common for legal theorists to offer hermeneutical characterizations
of the way legal actors understand themselves without providing empirical
support; I am surely guilty of this many times over. Oman may bear a
special burden, however, because his account is deliberately provocative
and unconventional, depicting as common sense what Holmes
characterized—more than a century ago—as the distant past.11
Additionally, there is the fact that the overwhelming majority of tort suits
do not go to trial, but rather settle in a context where the plaintiff consents
to receiving money and foregoing any admission of responsibility by the
defendant, and thus any public vindication. Finally, it is well established
that the great majority of tort claims are brought in areas quite distant from
the sort of intentional tort claim (battery, fraud, defamation) where the
hermeneutical version of the honor thesis is the most plausible.
3. Normative
Oman offers a powerful argument that, notwithstanding the erosion
(happily) of vertical hierarchies in which an older concept of honor made
sense, contemporary societies like our own maintain a horizontal
conception of honor.12 On this view, each person stands as an equal to each
other, and is entitled to be regarded as an equal. The law makes this
promise authentic by allowing those who have been injured through a
failure to accord them equal respect to demand such equal standing by
calling the wrongdoer to account. Private law is the system through which
individuals can maintain their honor; they do so by bringing lawsuits
against those who have wronged them and brought them down. Honor
conceived as dignity and equality is a value that is worth treasuring; this
undergirds a justification for the maintenance of private law.
The foregoing argument is seriously incomplete, for it fails to explore the
existence of alternatives for securing these values, the success of private
law in securing these values, and the collateral costs associated with doing
so. One of the most precious aspects of individual well-being and dignity—
the right against aggressive physical attacks by others—is a right that we
protect largely through criminal law. Although individuals do not
themselves possess the power to initiate a prosecution13 the state has a
responsibility to do so, and there are both formal and informal mechanisms
designed to ensure that the state attends to that responsibility. In legal
systems with more robust regulation, certain aspects of physical wellbeing—freedom from industrial pollution in one’s residential community,
freedom from race-based hate speech—may be better protected, and in that
sense individual dignity may be more protected. Conversely, a private law
11. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2-4 (Dover ed. 1991) (1881).
12. Oman, supra note 1, at 53–55 (citing, among others, FRANK HENDERSON STEWART,
HONOR (1994)).
13. In fact, English law initially recognized such private powers, see Juan Cardenas, The
Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 359–61 (1986),
as did American colonial law, id. at 366–71. Some foreign jurisdictions, such as France
continue to do so. Id. at 384–86.

2012]

HONOR AND CIVIL RECOURSE

65

system as expensive and highly bureaucratized as our mass tort law, for
example, may be so weak at delivering vindication and so alienating as to
undercut any serious defense of private law as a good means of protecting
individual honor.
II. HONOR, EQUALITY, AND PRIVATE LAW:
A RIGHTS-BASED FRAMEWORK
Two of the most memorable features of Oman’s article are the discussion
of the social function of dueling14 and the recounting of the Marquis
Evremonde episode from Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities.15 In the former,
dueling is described as having “its own logic” and applying as only among
social equals who, by issuing challenge to another, were forcing a rival “to
address him as an equal.”16 In the Marquis case, an aristocrat kills a man’s
child while driving his carriage recklessly through the streets of Paris, and
then tosses the man a coin while berating him for permitting his child to
wander.17 Both examine a conception of honor that Oman seems to
concede is now outmoded, and both seem to be outside the range of social
norms concerning honor that undergird private law in our legal system
today. Oman’s choice of these examples and their salience in the piece
actually point the way to a somewhat different conception of the place of
honor in private law, a conception that would not be vulnerable to the
criticisms laid out in Part I, above, and would have several of the attributes
that Oman is seeking.
Part of what is remarkable about the Marquis example is how appalling it
is. It is morally appalling not simply because the Marquis did in fact
behave (in killing the child and then simply throwing a coin to the father) in
a manner that displayed utter indifference to the value of another human
being, but because he was entitled to do so. In reading Oman’s rendering of
Dickens, one is appalled because one sees that the child did not have an
effective right not to be so injured and the parent did not have a legal right
to seek redress for what had been done to the child. This was, in part,
because of the vertical hierarchy built into that society; the Marquis was
immune, beyond accountability. In the face of the conviction that the child
ought to have had such right against injury and the parent ought to have had
some right of redress, the complete absence of such rights is morally
stirring.
Let us now focus more carefully upon these two convictions: the
conviction that the child had a right to be free of such injury, even by the
Marquis, and the conviction that the parent had a right of redress against the
Marquis. Neither of these is really a conviction about the importance of
keeping honor or restoring lost honor. To say that the child had a right not
to be so injured, even by this powerful person, is to say that duties to refrain
14. Id. at 43–49.
15. Id. at 60–63 (citing CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES (Modern Library ed.
1996) (1859)).
16. Id. at 57.
17. See id. at 60.
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from mistreating others in various ways apply to human beings,
notwithstanding status. This is in part about equality, and the implications a
norm of equality have for a wide range of human actions.
To say that the child or the parent should be able to call the Marquis to
account for this terribly wrongful conduct is not to say something about
honor or the importance of restoring it. It is to say something about the
right of redress, the right to redress a wrong that one has suffered (or one’s
child has suffered). It is not the honor regained, it is the standing to assert a
rights violation and have a right of redress.
When we put both convictions together, we get one forceful and coherent
package conjoining two normative ideas: human beings have rights not to
be mistreated by others, and have rights to hold others accountable to them
if they are so mistreated. In a legal system that includes within it a healthy
form of private law like our own, the legal right not to be mistreated packs a
punch: it carries with it a legal power to hold someone accountable for
violating this right. By recognizing both a right not to be mistreated and a
power to hold an injurer to account for such mistreatment, our system
provides each individual with dignity. Indeed, one might say that each is
accorded the honor of being deemed to stand on equal footing with all
others, and that our system puts its money where its mouth is by actually
granting standing to each to hold others accountable through private law,
regardless of status.
Remarkably, our legal system actually provides every member with a
right to challenge others to something like a duel, at least insofar as
litigation in private law is something like a duel. In a strong embrace of an
egalitarian norm, our system actually empowers each to demand of others
that they face him or her in litigation on equal terms.18 As compared to a
society that provides only restricted access to dueling, our system is better
in at least three respects: (1) litigation is more civil and less violent; (2)
litigation is open to all, and equal; and (3) the contest is keyed to remedying
the wrong that was done, typically in a practically useful manner.
The account above is, in one sense, about the honor of private law. Our
private law deems each person to merit the honor of being an obligee of
certain duties of conduct and having the power to hold others to account.
This is a kind of honor that is fundamental to our civil society, and is a
recognition in a meaningful way of making real the political value of
equality. In all of these respects, I believe that Oman is correct to assert
that recognition of the honor of each person is a basic feature of private law,
and one that is critical to its justifiability.
It is critical to see, however, that Oman’s account is fundamentally
teleological whereas mine is not. Oman depicts private law as performing
the function of allowing individuals to regain their honor; he depicts the

18. I do not mean to deny that tort law as we actually have it in the United States today
is subject to serious criticisms from an egalitarian point of view, and that one of these
criticisms might be that litigants with different resources for lawyers and experts do not, in
reality, stand on equal terms.
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system as in this sense aiming at private persons’ restoration of honor.19 In
my own brief account, by contrast, the recognition of the dignity of each is
constitutive and not functional. It depicts private law as committed to the
dignity of each, in an egalitarian manner, and committed in a way that is not
just words but rights and empowerment. The honoring of each lies in the
imposition of duties on all to treat them as valuable and requiring
recognition, and the empowerment of each to call others to account through
the state. To be sure, an individual choice to exercise this power is
sometimes made for the express or implicit purpose of regaining a sense of
honor and regaining the esteem of others, but that is a contingent matter.
So too is the matter of whether the strategy of using rights of action for this
purpose actually succeeds.
A constitutive conception of civil recourse and honor is not vulnerable to
the criticisms I have articulated to Oman’s teleological view: positive,
hermeneutical, and normative. Tort doctrine is not designed to restore
honor; the law of remedies is in some ways designed for restoration, but
restoration of a variety of goods that tortfeasors harm or damage—honor
being only one among them (and typically not the most important). Yet tort
doctrine is designed to empower plaintiffs to demand damages as part of an
act of self-restoration. A large part of the reason it is so designed is that the
system recognizes that to treat people as equals is to treat them as entitled to
be free of certain injuries inflicted by others and therefore to be entitled to
demand rectification from those others if they wrongfully injure these rightholders. And, in doing so, our system is expressing equal regard for the
dignity of each.
Tort plaintiffs sometimes sue to restore a sense of honor, but often sue
for many other reasons: obtaining compensation for their injury, ensuring
that a defendant’s harmful conduct is recognized by others, accounting for a
loss, paying one’s bills, expressing one’s anger, or trying to heal. By
making a private right of action in tort a right that the plaintiff has
discretion to exercise or not to exercise, the system empowers individuals to
act for these and other reasons, or even to act for an ill-defined set of
reasons. What plaintiffs do understand (at least if their lawyers are acting
as they are ethically bound to act), is that the right to make this decision—
and certain key steps along the way in carrying out the decision (like
whether to settle or whether to go to trial)—are choices that belong to the
plaintiff. Insofar as plaintiffs are able to understand this power as their own
(and that remains unclear), their self-understanding arguably includes a
sense that the state is treating them with dignity; conversely, insofar as
defendants understand themselves to be at the mercy of tort plaintiffs, they
do indeed feel commensurately humbled. In these respects, a rights-based
conception of civil recourse theory explains the relevance of honor at a
hermeneutical level, too.

19. Oman, supra note 1, at 69 (“The arguments in this Article suggest that ultimately the
vindication of honor provides a justification for civil recourse in the private law.”).
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Finally, a rights-based foundation for the honor-engaging defense of civil
recourse theory also works well at a normative level. First of all, in a
rights-based account—as opposed to a teleological account—we are free to
concede that in certain respects and in certain cases, a criminal prosecution
may be far more critical to the vindication of honor than a private lawsuit
would be. To take a contemporary example, the hotel maid who claimed
she was raped by Dominique Strauss-Kahn has indeed filed a civil claim
against him and the possibility of success in that claim remains,
notwithstanding the dismissal of the criminal indictment.20 Yet I think it
would be widely agreed that any vindication of her honor from a successful
tort claim will pale in comparison to the vindication that would have been
delivered by a successful criminal prosecution. The defensibility of private
law in connection with honor does not turn principally on how successfully
honor is in fact vindicated by exercises of the right to sue. It turns on the
equal respect expressed through the provision to each of a right to sue. The
honoring of each lies in the empowerment of each to hold the other
accountable, not in the respects in which self-esteem or reputation are likely
to be changed by the litigation itself. Of equal importance, the honoring
lies in the fact that the wide array of norms of conduct in private law
impose duties running from each to all, not to mistreat others; to keep one’s
promises to them; to respect their property and person alike.
CONCLUSION
In setting up his elegantly structured article, Oman writes: “Is it
normatively desirable for victims to act against those who have wronged
them?”21 He criticizes me and my co-author, John Goldberg, for failing to
supply an adequate defense of the practice of acting against a wrongdoer,
and he purports to supply a justification for doing so: the vindication or
regaining of insulted honor. My own view is that neither the explanation
nor the justification for tort law requires answering that question.
Moreover, were I forced to answer the question of whether it is normatively
desirable for victims to act against those who wronged them, I would give
the one answer that the careful philosopher and the prudent lawyer would
agree upon: It depends. Nor am I persuaded that a teleological honor-based
account provides a general justification for an affirmative answer to the
question.
Nonetheless, I think Oman is onto something when he looks at honor,
dignity, and equality as the core of the normative defense of civil recourse
theory that must be spelled out. The honor is not, however, the good that is
gained by a tort plaintiff exercising her right of action. The honor lies in
the state’s recognition of the right of each not to be wrongfully injured by
others and to demand accountability if they are so injured.

20. See Colin Moynihan, Strauss-Kahn Wants Judge to Dismiss Accuser’s Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2012, at A23.
21. Oman, supra note 1, at 42.

